Tokyo: United Nations University, Gilligan, Emma. Princeton, Princeton University Press, Grieve, Dominic. Halloran, Richard. Hoffman, Bruce. Inside Terrorism. New York: Columbia University Press, Jaramillo, Michelle. Joes, James. Johnston, Patrick and Seth Jones. Joseph, Teresa. Kilcullen, David.
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The Dual Function of Violence in Civil Wars: The Case of Colombia
He is currently working as an International Protection Officer for the non-governmental organization, Nonviolent Peaceforce, in South Sudan. They must not only be undefeated; they must be seen as undefeated. Strategically, the insurgents aim must be to provoke the external power into escalating its forces on the ground.
Such a process of escalation did, in fact, mark the history of the conflicts in Indochina, Algeria, Portuguese Africa, Vietnam and the current conflict in Ulster. In this regard, the U. In this regard, consider "the rise of populist movements" in our author's concluding paragraph above? From a foreign policy point of view, as the following statements by former British Prime Minister Theresa May and present U. President Donald Trump would seem to confirm:. The days of Britain and America intervening in sovereign countries in an attempt to remake the world in our own image are over.
In this regard the U. Herein, the U. And the retreat from efforts to transform and modernize the states and societies of the Rest of the World. The "cultural backwardness" entities [the conservative elements of both "our" and indeed "their" civilizations]. Our "victory," at the end of the Old Cold War, being thought of in this way?
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So that they might better provide for the capitalism and free trade wants, needs and desires of the U. Worked in Vietnam versus the much more-powerful U. By the imperial power for example, the U. As per Sun Tzu? Is it in this such "defeat our much-weaker opponents' 'political attrition' strategy light" that:. First, from the Trump National Security Strategy re: Africa, to understand what our "transformative" efforts are designed to achieve:.
We will work with reform-oriented governments to help establish conditions that can transform them into trading partners and improve their business environment. We will support economic integration among African states.
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We will work with nations that seek to move beyond assistance to partnerships that promote prosperity. In the David Kulcullen item, that I provide in my initial comment below, you may -- upon looking carefully -- note:. And see:. Callwell, who expressed the problem along these lines:. The great nation which seeks expansion in remote quarters of the globe must accept the consequences. Then might this such understanding help to explain why the U.
They also face each other as the fountainheads of two hostile and incompatible ideologies, systems of government and ways of life, each trying to expand the reach of its respective political values and institutions and to prevent the expansion of the other. This is the central question addressed here. To put it in other ways, is the body of treaty-based international law relating to occupations, some of which is more than a century old, appropriate to conditions sometimes faced today? These questions have arisen in various conflicts and occupations since —including the tragic situation in Iraq since the United States—led invasion of March—April They have arisen because of the cautious, even restrictive assumption in the laws of war also called international humanitarian law or, traditionally, jus in bello that occupying powers should respect the existing laws and economic arrangements within the occupied territory, and should therefore, by implication, make as few changes as possible.
This conservationist principle in the laws of war stands in potential conflict with the transformative goals of certain occupations. This strategic mismatch might prove catastrophic in the years ahead if the United States cannot figure out how to align means with ends in a successful strategy. The new American way of war perverts and thus prevents us from doing so.
Tactics without strategy is the noise before defeat. There is no instance of a nation benefiting from prolonged warfare. Speed is the essence of war. These days it is customary to think of war and conflict as prolonged affairs that afflict the farthest-flung precincts of US influence, thereby demanding a long-term American military presence on the ground.
Armed Group Structure and Violence in Civil Wars
We are told by the experts that this new way of war requires time, patience, modest amounts of blood, and vast amounts of treasure. Sun Tzu was highlighting strategy, and strategy is about choice, options, and the wisest use of resources in war to achieve political objectives. Yet in the new way of American war, tactics have buried strategy, and it precludes any options other than an endless and likely futile struggle to achieve the loyalty of populations that, in the end, may be peripheral to American interests.
Such patterns are readily recognizable in historical examples of resistance warfare, but less so in classical counter-insurgency theory. Politically, in many cases today, the counter-insurgent represents revolutionary change, while the insurgent fights to preserve the status quo of ungoverned spaces, or to repel an occupier — a political relationship opposite to that envisaged in classical counter-insurgency.
Pakistan's campaign in Waziristan since exemplifies this.